

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6652

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 1642

EXDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY HABIB AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJECT: US-TURKISH SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

1. IN THE WAKE OF SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S VISIT, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE BEEN REVIEWING THE SITUATION HERE, AND I THOUGHT YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE OUR LATEST ASSESSMENT AND REFLECTIONS. WE HOPE THIS UPDATING WILL BE USEFUL TO YOU IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE TAKING FOLLOWING SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

2. THE CLIFFORD VISIT TO ANKARA WAS A VALUABLE ONE--IN NO SMALL MEASURE BECAUSE OF HIS SKILLFUL PERSONAL PERFORMANCE. IT HAD SOME NEGATIVES, AS WE ANTICIPATED. LEADERS IN THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT REMAIN CONCERNED THAT IT WILL OPEN THEM UP TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL ATTACK AND END UP INHIBITING WHAT LIMITED FLEXIBILITY THEY HAVE IN THE CYPRUS SITUATION. THEY CONTINUE TO WORRY, TOO, ABOUT MAKARIOS' INADVERTENTLY BEING MADE MORE INTRANSIGENT. THEY CONTINUE TO FRET OVER THEIR IMPRESSION THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD ARRIVED HERE WITH A FAR BETTER BRIEFING ON THE GREEK CASE THAN ON THE TURKISH CASE. IN ADDITION, SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S NECESSARY REITERATION OF THE STRONG US FEELINGS AGAINST
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THE SECOND PHASE OF THE TURKISH/CYPRUS OPERATION CAUSED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF RENEWED HEARTBURN. (PRESIDENT KORUTURK, FOR EXAMPLE, REFERRED TO THIS RATHER TESTILY WHEN ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER MADE HIS FEBRUARY 25 FAREWELL CALL).

3. ON THE PLUS SIDE OF THE LEDGER, SECRETARY CLIFFORD

ABLY HANDLED HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS HERE IN A WAY THAT SKILLFULLY AVOIDED GIVING GROUNDS FOR OFFENSE. AT THE SAME TIME, IN HIS PRIVATE SESSIONS WITH A WIDE RANGE OF KEY TURKISH OFFICIALS, AND THROUGH A NOTABLE COMBINATION OF COURTESY AND CANDOR, HE PUT ACROSS SOME VERY FRANK VIEWS. MOST OF THE TIME THE TURKS DIDN'T LIKE WHAT HE WAS SAYING--BUT THEY LIKED HIM, AND THEY LISTENED CAREFULLY TO WHAT HE SAID. MOREOVER, THEY FELT THAT HE WAS LISTENING TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW TOO, ALSO CANDIDLY EXPRESSED. (THEY WERE ALSO GRATIFIED BY HIS STATEMENT THAT HE PERSONALLY FAVORED EARLY PASSAGE OF THE DCA. HE WAS CAREFUL TO LEAVE OPEN, HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF THE PRACTICALITY OF THIS STEP AND OF WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S OWN VIEW WOULD BE.) ABOVE ALL SECRETARY CLIFFORD SKILLFULLY EXPLOITED THE TURKS' DESIRE NOT REPEAT NOT TO GIVE AN INTRANSIGENT IMAGE TO THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION. AND IN THE END HE WENT AWAY WITH SOMETHING WHICH--BARRING ANKARA'S AND/OR DENKTASH'S BACKSLIDING -- COULD PROVE TO BE OF IMPORTANCE IN MOVING THE CUPRUS SITUATION FORWARD. MOREOVER, IF MOTION FROM THE GREEK SIDE ALSO MATERIALIZES, HE HAS LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO COME BACK FOR MORE.

4. CONCERNING OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT TURKISH SCENE, THE ECONOMY REMAINS BELEAGUERED, BUT I DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY STARTLING DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO IT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE CIVIL DISORDER PROBLEM IS STILL ACUTE -- SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT WE ARE WATCHING CAREFULLY FOR ANY EARLY WARNING OF

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MILITARY INTERVENTION OR SOME OTHER EXTRAORDINARY STEP TO DEAL WITH WHAT HAS FOR SOME TIME NOW BEEN A DANGEROUS, TRAGIC AND NATIONALLY DEBILITATING SITUATION. WHILE WE CAN NEVER BE CERTAIN OF WHAT THE YOUNGER OFFICERS ARE THINKING, SO FAR WE HAVE NO EARLY WARNING SIGNS OF MILITARY ACTION. IN OTHER WORDS, IN THE ECONOMY AND CIVIL DISORDER AREA, THE SITUATION REMAINS VERY MUCH AS IN OUR PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS.

5. ON THE AEGEAN SITUATION, THE TURKS WERE NOT HAPPY WITH CARAMANLIS' EXPOSITIONS TO SECRETARY CLIFFORD ABOUT TURKISH EXPANSIONISM. AS YOU KNOW, THE TURKS FEEL VERY DEEPLY THAT JUST THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE. THUS WE CONTINUE TO HAVE ON OUR HANDS TWO ALLIED STATES, EACH CONVINCED THAT IT HAS TAKEN AS MUCH FROM THE OTHER AS IT IS GOING TO. THIS REMAINS A DANGEROUS AND WORRISOME SITUATION, ALTHOUGH FOR THE PRESENT IT IS ON SOMETHING OF A BACKBURNER AND SHOULD STAY THERE UNTIL THIS SPRING WHEN THE STATE OF THE AEGEAN AND CYPRUS

NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE A KEY TO WHETHER WE HAVE A RENEWAL OF TROUBLE THERE OR NOT. SO THIS SITUATION, TOO, REMAINS PRETTY MUCH AS INDICATED IN OUR PREVIOUS REPORTING.

6. WHAT IS CHANGING IS THE PROSPECT OF EARLY ELECTIONS. ECEVIT HAS COME OUT FOR THEM; DEMIREL HAS "IN PRINCIPLE," AND TOLD SECRETARY CLIFFORD THAT HE NOW THOUGHT THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE IN JUNE RATHER THAN OCTOBER. WHILE THE EMBASSY IS NOT YET CERTAIN THAT PARLIAMENTARY MANUEVERING WILL PERMIT A JUNE ELECTION, WE DO THINK THE PROSPECTS FOR THEM HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED.

7. MY EMBASSY AND COUNTRY TEAM COLLEAGUES AND I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET THE DCA THROUGH THE US CONGRESS BEFORE THE TURKISH ELECTION CAMPAIGN STARTS IN EARNEST. FAILURE TO DO SO,
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IS A HIGH-RISK COURSE INDEED. THIS ACTION HAS ALREADY BEEN DELAYED TO THE POINT WHERE WE NOW CANNOT BE SURE, EVEN IF THE CONGRESS ACTS, THAT THE DCA AND THE DEGREE OF TURKISH SECURITY COMMITMENT TO THE WEST WILL NOT BECOME SERIOUS DOMESTIC ISSUES. WE REMAIN CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RISKS OF THE LATTER WILL BE GREATLY INCREASED IF CONGRESS HAS NOT ACTED BY THE TIME THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS IN FULL SWING. IN SUM, THE LONGER WE WAIT, THE GREATER THE RISK THAT ELECTION AND POST-ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS HERE WILL DESTROY THE OPPORTUNITY WE STILL HAVE TO STABILIZE THE US/TURKISH SECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

8. WITH THE FOREGOING IN MIND, GOT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN URGING THAT WE FIND A WAY TO GET THE DCA ENDORSED BY THE US CONGRESS BEFORE THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN GETS FULLY UNDERWAY. WHEN THE TURKS TALK WITH US ON THIS SUBJECT THEY ARE, OF COURSE, MAKING THEIR MAXIMUM THEIR MINIMUM. FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THEY DO NOT CONSIDER LESSER OPTIONS WITH US. BUT GIVEN THE PRACTICALITIES WE FACE, THIS EMBASSY AND WASHINGTON DO HAVE TO LOOK TOGETHER AT ALTERNATIVES SO THAT IF THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT GET TIMELY CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE DCA, WE HAVE SOME KIND OF GAME PLAN READY

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6653

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 1642

EXDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY HABIB AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

IN AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE THE SERIOUS RISKS THAT WE
WILL THEN INEVITABLY RUN.

9. ONE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER TO
ANNOUNCE THAT HE FAVORS CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF
THE DCA, NOTING HOWEVER THAT IT IS IMPRACTICAL TO
EXPECT EXPEDITIOUS ACTION ON IT BECAUSE OF OTHER
CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITIES. THIS KIND OF STATEMENT COULD
BE COUPLED WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION
WOULD, IN THE MEANTIME, SEEK FROM THE CONGRESS AN
APPROPRIATION ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO WHAT IS CALLED
FOR UNDER THE DCA AND LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO
RESTRICTIONS (REMOVING CURRENT FMS CEILING AND
UNFREEZING PIPELINE AID). THIS COULD BE COUPLED WITH
SOME BEHIND-THE-SCENES HARD-NOSED NEGOTIATIONS TO GET
ONE OR TWO INSTALLATIONS OPEN WHILE SHUTTING DOWN
KARAMURSEL - THE LATTER BEING SOMETHING THAT THE
MILITARY AND NSA ARE PREPARED TO DO ANYWAY.

10. ANOTHER APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE PRESIDENT
TO ANNOUNCE THAT HE HAS NOT MADE UP HIS MIND ABOUT
THE DCA AND IS THEREFORE NOT PREPARED TO PUSH IT AT
THIS TIME, BUT THAT HE IS AGAINST THE EMBARGO AND
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WILL URGE THE CONGRESS TO REPEAL IT. THE PRESIDENT
WOULD ALSO INDICATE THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO BE
BOUND BY THE FIGURES CITED IN THE DCA BUT HE COULD
PASS THE WORD PRIVATELY TO THE TURKS THAT HE WOULD
KEEP THEM IN MIND AND SEEK TO USE THEM AS VERY ROUGH
GUIDELINES IN SETTING HIS APPROPRIATION REQUEST TO

CONGRESS. (COMMENT: GETTING RID OF THE EMBARGO WILL BE CONGRESSIONALLY VERY DIFFICULT, BUT SHOULD BE LESS DIFFICULT THAN GETTING THE DCA ENDORSED. AND IT WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF LEAVING THE US COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC AID LEVELS MORE FLEXIBLE. THIS APPROACH, TOO, COULD BE COUPLED WITH A BATTLE TO GET TWO OF THE THREE KEY INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS STARTED AGAIN.)

11. ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE NOT TO SEEK ACTION AT THIS TIME ON THE DCA, GO TO CONGRESS THIS YEAR WITH A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER APPROPRIATION REQUEST THAN IS CALLED FOR IN THE DCA, RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO A SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF TURKISH DETERRENT STRENGTH ON THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO, BE PREPARED TO ACQUESCE IF NECESSARY IN THE PERMANENT DISMANTLING OF DIYARBIKIR, SINOP AND KARAMURSEL, BUT INSIST ON RETAINING THE INCIRLIK AIRBASE AND OTHER FACILITIES HERE, AND STRIVE TO MAINTAIN SOME CONTINUING LEVERAGE WITH WHICH TO MODULATE GREEK/TURKISH TENSIONS.

12. WHILE THERE ARE OTHER VARIATIONS, ELABORATIONS, AND COMBINATIONS OF THESE OPTIONS WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED, WE MUST AGAIN STRESS THAT WE REGARD ALL THESE OPTIONS AS A DISTANT AND RISKY "SECOND BEST" TO THE PROMPT PASSAGE OF THE DCA. THEIR ADOPTION WILL PRODUCE AN ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT HERE. (DEPARTMENT WILL ALSO NOTE THAT CAGLAYANGIL HAS ALREADY SOUGHT TO HEAD US OFF FROM A VARIATION OF CONFIDENTIAL

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THESE OPTIONS, AS REPORTED EMBTEL 1545).

MOREOVER, THEY WOULD ALL PRESENT A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO FIND ANOTHER WAY TO ELIMINATE THE ADMINISTRATIVELY UNPALATABLE "PROVISIONAL STATUS" FOR US MILITARY OPERATIONS CURRENTLY IN FORCE HERE.

13. AN OPTION WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND BE AVOIDED IS OPENING UP THE DCA FOR RENEGOTIATION AT THIS POINT. ASIDE FROM THE TIME LOST, THIS WOULD OPEN PANDORA'S BOX AND WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE END RESULT WOULD BE A MORE ADVANTAGEOUS AGREEMENT. IN SUM, I THINK WE SHOULD STICK WITH THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE, OR TRY TO GET ALONG WITHOUT ONE FOR SOME TIME TO COME.

14. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE DCA IS BEING RE-EXAMINED BY

THE ADMINISTRATION AT THIS TIME. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO URGE THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION ENDORSE THIS AGREEMENT, IF FOR ANY REASON IT DOES NOT PRESENTLY WISH TO DO SO, WE STRONGLY URGE THAT IT CONTINUE TO KEEP THE AGREEMENT "UNDER STUDY" RATHER THAN MAKE ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT REPUDIATING IT THE LATTER WOULD PRODUCE AN EXTREMELY BAD REACTION HERE AND SHOUL NOT REPEAT NOT BE DONE UNTIL A SUBSTITUTE GAME PLAN IS EFFECTIVELY UNDER WAY.

15. RETURNING TO THE CYPRUS SITUATION, I BELIEVE THAT IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE TURKS' RELUCTANCE TO APPEAR INTRANSIGENT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AT THE VERY START OF ITS TERM. WE SHOULD PLAY VERY "HARD BALL" WITH THE GOT IN ORDER TO MOVE THEIR POSTURE ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION TO AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND FLEXIBLE A ONE AS POSSIBLE.

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16. HAVING DONE THIS, HOWEVER, AND REGARDLESS OF HOW FAR WE'VE GOTTEN, WE SHOULD MAKE OUR EFFORT SOONEST WITH CONGRESS, NOT BECAUSE OF WHAT THE TURKS HAVE OR HAVE NOT DONE, BUT BECAUSE IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS TO STABILIZE OUR TURKISH RELATIONSHIPS BEFORE THE US PRESENCE AND POWER IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN -- AND TURKEY'S ROLE IN NATO -- PERMANENTLY DETERIORATE.

17. BECAUSE TIMING IS SO URGENT, MY COLLEAGUES AND I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON NOT REPEAT NOT WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE MARCH 31 VIENNA TALKS TO REACH DECISIONS AS TO WHAT WE WILL DO WITH RESPECT TO MOVING THE DCA FORWARD. ON THE CONTRARY, I URGE THAT A FIRM GAME PLAN BE DEVELOPED BEFORE THEN, TO BE LAUNCHED ONCE THE VIENNA MEETING IS UNDERWAY. (THE TURKS WOULD BE REMINDED HOWEVER THAT THEIR POST-MARCH 31 PERFORMANCE COULD WELL AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF OUR EFFORT.)

18. ONE FINAL POINT. THE TURKS HOPE THAT AFTER A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION, PRESIDENT CARTER WILL SUPPORT CONGRESSIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF THE DCA, AND THEY BELIEVE THAT IF HE DOES, HE WILL EVENTUALLY PREVAIL WITH CONGRESS. THE FACT THAT THERE IS NOT AT THE MOMENT A "PRESIDENTIAL COUNTERWEIGHT" TO WHAT THE TURKS CONTINUE TO REGARD AS CONGRESSIONAL "HOSTILITY" IS UNDERSTANDABLE TO THEM. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MUST HAVE SOME TIME TO MAKE HIS OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION. BUT IF CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION CONTINUES, THEN A PUBLIC

PRESIDENTIAL BALANCING ROLE WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF
WE ARE TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF A FURTHER HOLDING
ACTION HERE.

19. I HOPE YOU WILL SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH SECRETARY
CLIFFORD AND MATT NIMETZ.
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Message Attributes

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